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The worldwide financial crisis that erupted in 2007 has revealed the fragility of major
financial institutions, and triggered the sharpest global recession since the 1930s. Before
the crisis, standard macro theory largely abstracted from financial intermediaries, and
macro forecasting models ignored information on bank balance sheets. The dramatic
events since 2001 require a rethinking of the role of global finance for real activity,
and will represent a challenge for economic research for years to come. Several of
my PEGGED research projects have addressed this challenge, by presenting novel
theoretical and empirical analyses of the role of global banks for business cycles in the
EU and in the world economy. These contributions also highlight the stabilising role of
government support to banks, during a financial crisis.
A tractable framework for analysing the interaction between banks and the real economy
is provided by Kolltnann, Enders and Mtiller (201l). That study incorporates a global
bank into a two-country macroeconomic simulation model. The bank collects deposits
tiom households and makes loans to entrepreneurs, worldwide. It has to finance a
fiaction of loans using equity. tn equilibrium, the loan rate exceeds the deposit rate - the
loan rate spread is adecreasing function of the bank's capital. Hence, bank capital is a
key state variable for domestic and foreign real activity. The simulation model predicts
that a loan loss shock originating in one country lowers the capital of the global banking
system; this raises lending rate spreads worldwide, triggering a global reduction in bank
lending and a worldwide recession. That framework can thus account for the fact that
the financial crisis originated in the US, but spread very rapidly to the EU and the rest
of the world - the key role of globally active European banks in the transmission of the
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crisis is highlighted by that fact that credit losses of European banks during the crisis
were largely due to foreign (US) loans.
In Kollmann (2012), I estimate the two-country model of Kollmann, Enders and
Mliller (2011); the statistical results confirm the key role of global banks in the crisis
transmission. The study finds that Eurozone investment is especially sensitive to
shocks to the health of global banks - about 50o/o of the fall rn EZ investment during
the crisis can be explained by shocks to the banking system. Kollmann and Zeugner
(201 I ) present turther empirical evidence that underscores the role of bank balance
sheet conditions for real activity. Specifically, that study analyses the predictive power
of bank leverage for real activity. The key result is that bank leverage is negatively
correlated with the future growth of real activity - the predictive capacity of leverage
is roughly comparable to that of the standard macro and financial predictors used by
forecasters. Kollmann and Zeugner also document that leverage is positively linked to
the volatilin' of future real activity and of equity returns. This finding is consistent with
the view that higher bank leverage amplifies the effect of unanticipated macroeconomic
and financial shocks on real activity and asset prices, i.e. that higher leverage makes the
economy more fragile.
The key role of bank health for the overall economy suggests that government support
for the banking system might be a powerful tool for stabilising real activity in a financial
crisis. In fact, an important dimension of fiscal policy during the crisis was massive state
aid fbr banks, e.g. in the form of purchases of bank assets and of bank recapitalizsations
by governments. Kollmann, Roeger and in'tVeld (2012) point out that, in the US and the
EU, these "unconventional" fiscal interventions were larger than "conventional" fiscal
stimulus measures (ternporary increases in government purchases and social transfers,
tax cuts). Conventional fiscal stimulus measures in the US amounted to 1.98o/a nd
l.JJo/o of US GDP in 2(X)9 and 2010. In the EU, the conventional stimulus amounted
to 0.83olo and0.73o/o f'EU GDP in 2009 and 2010, respectively. Bank rescue measures
rnainly occurred in 2009. In the EU, government purchases of impaired ("toxic")
bank assets and bank recapitalisations in 2009 amounted to 2.8o/o and I .9o/o of GDP,
1 0 8
nLihal *nx111, f;1*-l 
ryl;.1 :*ci l*t*rr:1.1i***l tuu1;n*1* e1cl1r
respectively. US government asset purchases and recapitalisations represented l.60/o
and 3.Io/a of GDP in 2009, respectively. In both the US and the EU, these two types of
bank support measures thus amounted to 4.7o/a of GDP, in 2009. Table I documents the
time profile of cumulated state aid for banks in the Eurozone, between February 2009
and April 2011.
Thble 1. Eurozone state aid for banks (cumulative, as Vo of GDP)
Source: in' t  Vcld and l loc; Icncia (201 1).
Surprisingly, the macroeconomic effects of these sizable bank support measures have
received little attention in the economics literature. Kollmann, Roeger and in't Veld
(2012) and Kollmann, Ratto, Roeger and in't Veld (2012) seek to fill this gap, by
adding a government to the banking model of Kollmann, Enders and Miiller (2011).
Government support for the banking system is modelled as a transfer to banks that is
flnanced by higher taxes. Kollmann, Ratto, Robger and in't Veld (2012) and Kollmann,
Roeger and in't Veld (2012) show that state aid to banks boosts bank capital, and that it
lowers the spread between the bank lending rate and the deposit rate, which stimulates
investment and output; the macroeconomic efficacy of state bank aid hinges on its
ability to lower the lending spread. Investment drops sharply in financial crises. Hence,
government support for banks helps to stabilise a component of aggregate demand
that is especially adversely affected by financial crises. By contrast, most conventional
tiscal stimulus rneasures (e.g. government purchases of goods and services) crowd out
investment. Kollmann, Ratto, Roeger and in't Veld (2012) and Kollmann, Roeger and
in't Veld (2012) show that the GDP mr-rltiplier of state aid to banking is in the same
range as conventional government spending rnultipliers.
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